What Progress Narratives Gain Us, and What They Cost

Immanuel Kant’s belief in progress was qualified and careful. Yet his vision of history teaches the wrong lessons. Augustine is a better guide.

Jacob T. LevyContributor, Liberalism.org
What Progress Narratives Gain Us, and What They Cost

The version of the Enlightenment progress narrative that I think still has a hold on us is Immanuel Kant’s. Kant does not say, a few rhetorical flourishes to the contrary notwithstanding, that inexorable human progress is a fact; I have already noted, in part one of this lecture, that the belief in inevitable progress was rarer in the Enlightenment than we may generally assume. What he does say is that the belief in ongoing perpetual moral progress is a necessary precondition for moral action. I’m going to emphasize moral here because that’s not quite the same as the objection about political action with which I’m concerned. But it is, I think, in the background of it, in the same way in which belief in God and belief in the immortality of the soul are, for Kant, not demonstrable truths, but necessary beliefs. In the same way in which freedom of the will is not a truth, but a necessary belief. In the same way in which the belief in cause and effect is a necessary belief for our action in the physical world, David Hume’s skepticism notwithstanding. 

Kant accepted that Hume had taught us we can’t treat the belief in physical causality as a fact. But, Kant added, in order to act in the world, we must believe it anyway. We must act as if we believe it. We must think as if we believe it. The belief in progress also has that structure in Kant’s thought. And I suspect for many of us now, this list of a priori necessary commitments includes some that are more plausible and some that are less. The belief in cause and effect and in the forward movement of time: those are probably necessary, for beings like us, outside the farthest reaches of speculative science fiction. Some very impressive philosophers deny that belief in freedom of the will is a necessary feature of action in the world, but it does seem that way to me. I don’t know what it’s like to wake up in the world and believe that one’s actions are determined in a way that you take seriously in the middle of actual action. I’m willing to believe that it might be true from a certain perspective that everything we do is physically or biologically or neurologically caused, and we are just things in the physical world, but I find it a useless thought. We go through life as if we’re making choices; that’s how it seems inside our brains. 

On the other hand, I don’t believe, and I think many of us now don’t believe, that a belief in God or the belief in the immortality of the soul is a necessary precondition for moral choices and moral actions. We don’t believe it in part because of transformations that Kant himself worked in the history of western moral philosophy. Kant was a deeply influential, if somewhat inadvertent, secularizer of Christianity. He left behind Christian doctrines in a language that was frequently stripped of overt theological commitments. Whether that is intellectually true to Kant’s project is a question of Kant interpretation on which I’m not entitled to a view. But it is one of the long-term effects of Kant’s philosophical revolutions that many old Christian ideas become treated as propositions in secular morality. 

In any case, now, I think, I hope, that many of us who walk around the world without a sure belief in the existence of God or the immortality of the soul, nonetheless think that we make morally significant choices. What about the belief in progress? Why would it be that a belief in progress is a necessary precondition for moral choice or, in the long term, for political choice? For Kant, the reasoning here really does strictly parallel and indeed intertwine with his accounts about God and the immortality of the soul: We must believe that our moral choice is not in vain. We must believe that our moral choice is part of a world that ultimately makes moral sense rather than being morally perverse. That means, in a sense, that we have to believe in a God who teleologically regulates the moral shape of history such that when we act well now, we can believe, we may allow ourselves to hope, that our good and right action now contributes to a long-term goodness and rightness of the world, including the political, historical world. 

There’s a related piece of Kant’s thought, which is the logical requirements of reciprocal action. We will need such reciprocal action if the world is to become better among us human beings, us unsociably sociable human beings, who are inevitably thrown together, but who also have inevitable forces driving us apart, our pride, our self-interest, our greed. If moral progress is to be possible among people like us, there must be a development of reciprocal norms, rules, and laws. Kant’s progress doctrine is most traditionally identified with his essay on universal history, but its connection to norm-governed reciprocity is probably most clearly seen in his essay on perpetual peace. We must, says Kant, act in international affairs in ways that leave open the future possibility of peace. That doesn’t mean we fight no wars, but it means we must fight wars under terms and rules that are compatible with having peace someday. A twentieth century word that would be useful in this context is to say, we must not fight genocidally because we must be able to imagine a future law-governed peaceful coexistence with that other, corporately-constituted, collective people. And Kant becomes, in part, a defense of the rules and laws of war. Rules and laws, indeed, that date in their intellectual justification to Augustine. 

When I have further length in the book, I will make an argument that that is not an accident, this ongoing relevance of the Augustinian project to this modern, hypothetical, Kantian version of the belief in progress. But we must not act as murderers in war. We must not slaughter civilians or prisoners. We must not send poisoners and assassins to sneak behind enemy lines and kill opposing leaders. Doing that kind of thing is a recipe for never reaching peace. The laws of war apply not because killing soldiers is morally good and killing civilians is morally bad, but because the regulated combat among soldiers is compatible with laying down our arms someday—and the mass indiscriminate slaughter of civilians, prisoners, or civilian leaders is not. That’s a demand of us. It is not a prediction. So phrased, what it’s telling us is not that we will reach a universal federation of republics living under terms of international law and perpetual peace. But we must imagine that possibility so that we feel the force of the demand to leave the path to it open. That is, I think, the most defensible version of the doctrine. 

Kant, however, pairs it with the account that says: And we must actually let ourselves believe it. Not we must imagine it. But we must believe we’re on our way. We must believe that morality is giving us a helping hand on the way to that future progress. What would Kant say in response to the account I gave in part one, about how we look back on the twentieth century, and how we keep looking back on the recent and distant pasts? After all, Kant knows that we have lived through evils and that we’ve lived through evils that were newer than other things that came before them. Kant says that part of what this act of imaginative belief does for us is that it allows us to tell a story of human history in which we are being guided through nature’s invisible plan through our unsociable natures toward that better future. The wars that we fight were necessary steps on our way to discovering the long-term value of peace. 

Here is where I recoil. This is a redemptive account of history. It tells us a narrative about the evils and the horrors in our past that is not one of grief, is not one of mournful acknowledgement. It is instead a kind of grateful acceptance that nature has so ordained human history, or God has so ordained human history, that our wars are inevitable steps in our learning process. Insofar as we adopt Kant’s perspective and then suffer through a new round of evils, the progress narrative here says that we must believe that we can redeem those wrongs through the attainment of some future good. 

This all sounds very un-Kantian. Doctrines about omelets and broken eggs are not what we associate with the philosopher of strict moral duty and law. I do not think he offers a way to square the circle. He’s never telling us, well, you’re justified in going to war. You’re justified in behaving unsociably sociable by killing your neighbor, just because that will be a step on the eventual learning process. It’s not action guiding. And yet, as soon as the action is over, it is apparently redeemed by the prospect of progress. 

Now, in conclusion, I’ll return to Augustine. Augustine has a sharp criticism of what he takes to be wish-fulfillment moralizations about historical time. Long before the Enlightenment, before the Renaissance, before the Scientific Revolution, before the economic takeoff, Augustine is well aware of moralized histories. They are familiar to him, not only, though in meaningful part, through Christianity. 

In a few centuries Christianity went from being the persecuted doctrine of the poor slaves of Rome to being the official religion of the empire that, in its own juridical imagination, constituted the whole known world. This invited a story of redemptive history. According to that narrative, it was necessary that the Roman Empire in particular should become the vehicle for God’s entry into the world. God incarnated only in the moment when the chaos and civil war of the late Roman Republic had given rise to unity under Caesar Augustus. One empire ruled by one man is the right place for the one God to manifest. It was Caesar Augustus who commanded that all the world should be taxed and counted. And therefore, Joseph has to go back to Bethlehem to be registered for the census. That’s the moment in which the Christian narrative begins. 

A religion that was, in that sense, deeply tied to Rome went from those humble beginnings, through the time of persecution, to the redemption of persecution in the conversion of Constantine, and the eventual adoption of Christianity as the religion of the empire. This seemingly finally offered an answer to the question that had bedeviled Christians since the second generation of the religion: When and how is the Second Coming to occur? 

The earliest Christians believed it would be within a generation. As soon as it wasn’t, there was a genuine kind of moral-theological puzzle: When and how? The answer that’s provided by many of Augustine’s Christian contemporaries is that it will happen when the Roman Empire completes its triumph—because the Roman Empire is the vehicle through which the one true faith is spreading through the world. Yet Augustine faces a moment when the Western Empire is crumbling. It has not yet fallen, but it is falling, and fast. The City of God Against the Pagans was inspired by the sack of the city of Rome. If the Roman Empire will not be the triumphant vehicle for the march of God through the world, what is the believing Christian to do? Augustine’s answer is a sharp one: Get over your superstitious numerology, which leads you to believe that you can foretell the time and the place. The time will come like a thief in the night. No man knows the hour. These are what Christ told us, emphasizes Augustine. All of you who have spent all of this time imagining either that you could read the future from the book of Revelation or that you could project knowable divine purpose onto Roman political history, you are engaged in idolatry and paganism. That is not what the Christian God is like. His ways are not for us to calculate in that sense, and the human, flawed institution of a political society, including Rome, is not the city of God. 

The terrestrial political world, says Augustine, is perpetually mixed between those who are saved and those who are damned. There are those who are true Christians, who love God more than themselves. And there is the ordinary run of humanity, many of whom call themselves Christians, but who love themselves more than they love God. We Romans, therefore, are not actually unified on the most important question. The most important question is our relationship to God. Rome is just a place. Its fall will not mean the end of the Christian truth. 

Augustine aims to free Christianity from this narrative of political history. But in so doing, he introduces an idea of secular history. It is not his chief interest. His chief interest is to preserve the truth of Christian history. But the truth of Christian history is protected by disentangling it from the ordinary secular history of political societies in all the time between now and the unknowable future of the Second Coming. Here in the world, we don’t redeem the persecutions. We have lived them, and it’s possible God had a purpose for them, but his purpose for them is not for us to know. And we mark them as evils. We don’t mark them as steps on the road to triumph. 

The passage from Augustine that provides the governing metaphor of my book is on what he calls “the peace of Babylon,” with a reference back to the book of Jeremiah. In the book of Jeremiah, the Jews have been taken into captivity in Babylon, and God sends a message through the prophet Jeremiah to the Jews in captivity, telling them that they ought to not only not resist their captivity, not only not seek to escape it, but to do their best to thrive where they are: Plant gardens, grow food, build houses, have sons and daughters, let your sons and daughters marry so that you will increase and not decline as a population in exile. Don’t listen to the false prophets who are trying to lead you into revolutionary violence and escape back to Jerusalem. Your escape back to Jerusalem will come in my time, says God, not yours. He does tell them that he will redeem them out of slavery in his time, which will be after seventy years. But in the meantime, stay where you are, thrive, and indeed seek the well-being of the city, seek the peace of the city where I have caused you to be taken captive. And pray for it most earnestly. For in the peace of that city you will find your peace. 

Now this is remarkable: You are slaves, says God. I’m not denying that you are slaves. You are in exile from your home. I’m not denying that you’re in exile from your home. But I’m not telling you only to refrain from resistance. I’m telling you to actively pray for Babylon. And when the God of the Old Testament tells the Jews to pray, he’s telling them to do something—something of tremendous efficacy in the world of the Old Testament. Use the most powerful tool at your disposal, says God, praying to me for the peace of Babylon. 

Augustine adapts the Jeremiah story into a prefigurative account of the lives of Christians on earth. The captivity of Babylon lasts seventy years, a human lifetime. The exile of the saved Christian from God also lasts a human lifetime. The saved Christian believers’ suffering in the terrestrial world will be redeemed. But it won’t be redeemed in the world. It’s redeemed by their eventual triumphant reunification with God after death. Jeremiah had offered only the prospect of redemption in the world, redemption in what we would then think of as secular political history: In seventy years, says God, I will let you back to Jerusalem. 

What Augustine says is the full meaning of Jeremiah’s story, in its eventual Christian truth, is that redemption is not to be found in the world at all. It seems to me that as we think about political normativity, for us in the world, there is something truer about Augustine’s doctrine than about either Jeremiah’s or Kant’s. Augustine tells us the evils are to be known as evils, and not to be treated as slightly hidden moral goods. And the way in which we know that’s true is by abolishing the progress narrative, the moralized account of political history. 

Is it the case, though, that this only works by holding out the prospect of the Christian redemption in the afterlife? This, it seems to me, is a harder question, and one that we can’t fully answer without knowing truths about theology that I, at least, don’t claim to know. But it is interesting to remember that Augustine is speaking not only to the saved Christians. The book includes among its audience the “saved” Christians who are risking error and heresy, but also the broad reach of the Roman citizenry. He is, for example, interested in persuading them that it’s false that Christians make bad soldiers, and that Christians in fact make good fellow citizens. He wants to persuade the Romans that it is not civically useful of them to return to the worship of the old gods. He wants to strip history of that moralized purpose for an audience that includes the non-believers. 

Why? Well, there is something morally salutary about being able to look back at Roman history with the jaundiced eye that he does through so much of The City of God and to say, this was wicked, and this was evil. Rome expanded unjustly. It fought wars of conquest that it lied about and pretended were wars of self-defense. It expanded so much that it became prone to civil war, which is among the greatest of human evils. And it will not last forever. There will be still evils to come. 

Augustine stripped away the moralized political window dressing, what eventually people in the twentieth century would call the ideology, of the Roman state. He seemed to think there was something morally worthwhile, maybe even for the nonbelievers, about the ability to name the truth about what political life is like, without the ideological blinders. Rain falls on the just and the unjust alike, Augustine quotes from the New Testament, and he suggests: so too does politics. The unjust as well as the just have an interest, the damned as well as the saved have an interest, in at least telling the truth about it raining, at least understanding the wrongs of what they are suffering through. The redemption narrative that Augustine rejects in his contemporaries is, I think, too close for comfort to the redemption narrative that follows from Kant’s progress narrative, which, remember, we left as the only one possibly left standing once we took seriously the evils of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and once, I think, we control for economic progress. 

The redemptive narrative teaches us the wrong lessons about avoiding evils, about mitigating harms. In teaching us in retrospect to redeem the harms of history, the redemptive narrative too sharply reduces the urgency of preventing them. Therefore, I believe, it actually impairs our necessary drive to engage in politics toward protection, toward mitigation, toward avoiding the worst of evils. There is something debilitating about the belief in progress. This is more obvious when the belief is that progress is inevitable. It’s debilitating, and politically incapacitating, because you don’t think you have to do anything. You can just ride the rising tide of moral progress. Maybe some people will act simply for the pleasure of being on the winning side, but hard, sacrificial action would seem irrational.

Kant doesn’t endorse that inevitability or the passive riding of the rising tide. He says that you are only allowed to believe in progress if you are acting. But his account introduces too sharp a contradiction between how I think about the evil that happened yesterday—which I’ve now redeemed—and how I think about the evil tomorrow, which I need to act politically to prevent. This is psychologically implausible, not to mention untrue to a world in which yesterday’s injustice still corrupts today’s social life.

And so, I think that, like inevitability narratives, like moralized and sacralized political histories, even Kant’s progress narrative distorts our vision and obscures from us the need to resist evils, both tomorrow’s and the continuing effect of yesterday’s.

To conclude, I’ll say that over the more than ten years that I’ve been working on this project, the actual politics of the world has gone through tumultuous times. There have been moments in which I think the people making this objection to me made it with a sharp belief that we need to be able to characterize the wickedness of some current moment as temporary and anomalous. We need to be able to imagine radically better futures, they insist. This is the stage of the argument at which I will sometimes hear talk about prefiguration and Occupy Wall Street: We need young people to be able to imagine a radically different world so that they can engage in the meaningful political action with which they engaged in Occupy Wall Street for six months. 

I don’t actually think that Occupy Wall Street is the defining case of political action, nor do I think that only young people are, as it were, entitled to or under an obligation to engage in political action. I think that young people will go on being sometimes idealistic and sometimes righteously furious at the world regardless of what I say or do. But consider those moments of looking at the wickedness of the contemporary world and saying, “This is an aberration, this is only lasting for a minute, and we must believe it’s only lasting for a minute, so that we can properly fight it.” 

In 2025, it seems to me this is now an impossible thought, and an irresponsible one. If there was a time when we could think that the crisis of liberal constitutional democracy, the rise of autocracy, the era of democratic backsliding, the rise of ethno-nationalist and fascist movements in the world, the rise of genocidal violence, if there was a moment that we might have thought all of this is a blip, a decade on, it’s much too late. And when I look at the world, I do not see political debilitation or incapacity in response to that. I see energy. Not always, in my middle-aged judgment, well-directed energy, not always thoroughly well-thought out energy, but, well, such is politics in a world of disagreement. But I see a world full of people who are willing to face the gravity of evils, and who are taking seriously the gravity of evils, and resisting that much more firmly, organizing that much more committedly, and thinking about what it is that brought us here and what it is that might help us escape it that much more seriously. I do not think that the world of 2025 acts as a falsification here. It seems to me that it acts as a piece of evidence for how it is that people can look political evil in the eye and name it for what it is, and for how they can take seriously their political responsibility to do what they can to end it.

Image credit: Michelangelo, “Jeremiah” (1511), public domain via Wikimedia Commons.


Note

1  This lecture, which we are publishing in two parts, was delivered at Jesus College, Cambridge, on November 25, 2025.

Jacob T. Levy

Contributor, Liberalism.org

Jacob T. Levy is the Tomlinson Professor of Political Theory at McGill University. He is the coordinator of McGill’s Research Group on Constitutional Studies and was the founding director of McGill’s Yan P. Lin Centre for the Study of Freedom and Global Orders in the Ancient and Modern Worlds. He is a Senior Fellow at the Niskanen Center, and has been a Distinguished Fellow for the Study of Liberalism and the Free Society of the Institute for Humane Studies and a Templeton Adam Smith Tercentenary Fellow at The University of Glasgow.

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