Aaron Ross Powell: Welcome to the Liberalism.org Show. I'm Aaron Ross Powell, Senior Director of Liberal Projects at the Institute for Humane Studies. It's not every day that a Supreme Court case begins as a blog post, but that's exactly how the one at the center of today's episode started. Ilya Somin, Professor of Law at George Mason University's Antonin Scalia Law School and the Kenneth Simon Chair in Constitutional Studies at the Cato Institute, joined me a few weeks ago for a conversation recorded live in front of an audience at the National Press Club. Ilya explains how his initial blog post suggesting someone ought to challenge the administration's emergency powers tariffs brought him all the way to the Supreme Court as co-counsel in that very case, which he ended up winning. We get into how it came together, why the Court found that emergency powers don't stretch to cover sweeping tariffs, what should actually count as an emergency, and the bigger question underneath, how a free society reins in a presidency that keeps testing its limits. With that, here's my conversation with Ilya. Ilya, what was the strategy behind this case? What did it take to put this together and then get it in front of the Supreme Court and decided in what seems like such a rapid pace?
Ilya Somin: Yeah. So I guess it takes several things, but perhaps unusually, this case actually started with a blog post. I regularly write blog posts for the Volokh Conspiracy law and politics blog, hosted at the Reason website for free, even so you can access it without paying anybody anything, including me. And I write blog posts about a lot of legal and political issues, uh, within my areas of expertise. Uh, in February of last year, Trump announced that he was going to be using the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977 to impose 25% tariffs on imports from Canada and Mexico and 10% against China, ostensibly for the purpose of combating fentanyl. I saw this. I wrote a blog post saying somebody should challenge this on the basis of three things. One is that, uh, this assertion of tariff authority goes against the major questions doctrine, which is the idea that when the president claims a delegation of power from Congress, at the very least, uh, if it's over a major economic or political issue, the delegation has to be clearly stated in the law in question, which in this case it pretty obviously was not. Second, that this might violate the constitutional non-delegation doctrine, which says that there are at least some limits on the powers that Congress can delegate to the president. And obviously, tariffs are a, uh, congressional power, not a presidential power. It says it right there in Article One of the Constitution, where we have, yes, the list of congressional powers. And finally, uh, borrowing, uh, an argument that, uh, was also being developed by some others that, well, maybe actually this statute, which doesn't even mention the word tariff, uh, and, uh, or any synonym for it and was never used to impose tariffs before, then maybe it just doesn't authorize any tariffs at all. Uh, and, you know, I wrote this blog post, and my idea was that other people would read it and hopefully bring the case. Uh, a few-- a little while later, uh, I got contacted by Jeff Schwab, who is the senior litigator, uh, for the Liberty Justice Center, which is, uh, a, uh, libertarian-leaning public interest law firm. He said, "We might be interested in bringing this case." Uh, so I said, "Great," but for a time we didn't do anything. It wasn't clear whether Trump was gonna continue these tariffs or not, but he did continue them. Uh, and in early April, he announced the so-called Liberation Day tariffs, uh, which would use the same IEEPA statute to impose 10% tariffs, uh, on virtually every country in the world, plus additional so-called reciprocal tariffs on some 50 or 60 more nations, which even though they were called reciprocal, weren't actually reciprocal at all because they applied even to countries like Switzerland and Israel, which impose no tariffs whatsoever on US imports. So at that time, Jeff and I and others at Liberty Justice Center community, again, they decided they wanted to bring the case and also that I should do a follow-up blog post recruiting potential clients for technical procedural reasons. Uh, we knew that we needed small businesses that directly import goods subject to these tariffs. Uh, and so in my blog post, I said, "We're recruiting these sorts of businesses." A bunch of businesses contacted either me or Liberty Justice Center and, uh, you know, we talked to them, and we ended up picking five clients. Also, LJC invited me, very nice of them to be one of the attorneys on the case. And even though I'm not really a litigator, I'm an academic, I'm an ivory tower kind of guy, I never really litigate, uh, nonetheless, that I should not refuse this invitation. So, uh, I joined for the big pro bono bucks that I was making, uh, um, uh, on this project. Uh, and, uh, once we had the five businesses in place to be our clients, well, representing them, well, also pro bono, uh, we decided to file the case in the Court of International Trade. Uh, and to make a long story short, we prevailed there on a number of different arguments we might talk about later. The case was appealed, uh, to the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, uh, which reviews cases from the Court of International Trade. We won there as well and ultimately in the US Supreme Court in a 6-3 decision. Uh, after the initial trial court phase of the case, we were joined, uh, by, uh, two very prominent legal scholars and Supreme Court litigators, Michael McConnell, a very famous conservative legal scholar and litigator who had argued many cases before the Supreme Court, uh, and Neal Katyal, a very famous Georgetown law professor and liberal Supreme Court litigator who had argued some 50 cases before the Supreme Court. Uh, and you know, they contacted me, expressed interest in joining the case, and, you know, LJC agreed. You know, they entered, and it was Neal who ultimately argued the case, uh, in appellate court before first the Federal Circuit and then eventually before the Supreme Court. So this case took a lot of work and effort, uh, more certainly on LJC's part than on mine. I just came up with sort of the initial blog post and some arguments, uh, but it did move at a rapid pace by judicial standards going from, uh, you know, an initial filing in April, uh, to oral argument in the Supreme Court in November and then a decision in February, which is actually quite fast by the pace of, uh, high-level, uh, major litigation. But I wish I had a penny for every time a representative of business came to me and said, "Our business is really suffering because of these horrible tariffs. When are you gonna finally get done with your case?" And I was like, "Well, this is moving fast by judicial standards." And they said, "You know, that's no consolation to us because we're losing money every day."
Aaron Ross Powell: I wanna get to the Supreme Court's decision and how and why it ruled in your favor. But before we do, as you described it, as you described the, the nature of the statute that the administration was using, the nature of their powers, the constitutional constraints they're operating under, it feels like their theory of their authority in this was effectively because I wanna. But can you steelman their side for us? Like, what's the best case or the case that they were offering for why it was more than just because I wanna?
Ilya Somin: Yeah. So one of the advantages that I and others saw early on to our side of this case is that we had multiple paths to victory. Depending on how you count, it's like six or seven different paths. I won't go through every single one, but I will note the major ones and then what the other side tried to say in response. The most obvious path, and the one that the Supreme Court ultimately went for, is simply this statute just doesn't author-authorize any tariffs at all. It doesn't mention the word tariff or a synonym like ta-- like duties or imports or anything else. It just says that in certain situations, uh, the president can, among other things, order the, quote, "regulation of importation." So their argument was, on that, was simply that, uh, imposing tariffs is a way of regulating because, uh, tariffs and other taxes, it's sort of basic Econ 101, have these regulatory effects, uh, in that they, you know, can reduce the quantity of a good that is purchased and bought, and this would reduce the quantity of imports. I think this argument is wrong, that there's a difference between being a regulation and having a regulatory effect. A tax or a tariff is just simply not the same thing as a regulation, but their argument is that anything that has a regulatory effect qualifies as a tax. Then a second argument we had we already touched on is that given the enormous scale of this, this would be the highest tariff schedule since the Smoot-Hawley tariffs, the Great Depression. It would impose $1.7 trillion of new taxes on Americans, massively damage the U.S. and world economies, and so on. We argued that this is a major question, and therefore it triggers the rule that there must be, uh, a clear statement in the statute. But their main argument in response actually made two kinds of arguments. One is they said, "Well, this doesn't really apply to foreign affairs." Uh, major question, whether we wait for domestic powers. In foreign affairs, the president should get greater discretion. Uh, and they also said, I think very weakly, but this argument had existed before, that the major questions doctrine applies to delegations, uh, to regulatory agencies, but not delegation directly to the president 'cause the president is special. Uh, I think this makes very little sense, especially under their theory that there's a unitary executive, that the whole, the whole executive branch should be folded under the control of the president, but nonetheless, they tried to make this distinction. Next, there's also the issue of non-delegation, the limits on the Congress's power to delegate authority to the president, and they basically said that this doesn't apply or only applies in weaker form to foreign affairs, similar to their response to major questions. Here, too, I think this is not a good argument in that, uh, there's no distinction between foreign affairs and domestic powers in the text of the Constitution, only between congressional and presidential powers. And additional tariffs are not really a pure foreign affairs power because it would massive taxes on Americans. If you wanna say that anything that applies to, uh, or has an effect on international relations or foreign affairs power for a big country like the U.S., that's almost everything important that the federal government does. Our domestic tax rates, regulations, and so on have foreign affairs effects, but nonetheless, they try to draw this distinction. In addition, the IEEPA statute, even if you assume that it authorizes tariffs, still it says whatever it authorizes can only be done in the event of an emergency or an, and that, and that emergency has to amount to an unusual and extraordinary threat to the American economy, national security, or foreign policy. Uh, the main pretext for the so-called Liberation Day tariffs enacted in April, which were much larger than the previous ones enacted initially against just the three countries, is the idea that trade deficits qualify as an emergency, an unusual and extraordinary threat. And there's nothing unusual or extraordinary about trade deficits. They've existed for 50 years or more on a large scale. They probably aren't even really a threat at all. Most economists say they're not a threat to the economy any more than my really massive trade deficit with my local supermarket is a big threat to me. Uh, they never buy any of my books or any of my other things that I produce. I buy a lot of stuff there, and it's, you know, maybe it's a problem for me, but it's not an emergency or an unusual or extraordinary threat. But their answer to all of this was, uh, you've got to defer to the president when he says that something is an emergency or a threat because he has access to better information, expertise, and the like, so it's up to him. Uh, and notice the combination of all of these arguments on their side is it would essentially be a boundless power to impose any tariffs he wants, any nation, at any rate, for any reason, for as long as he wants, uh, and so forth, so it's a virtually unlimited claim, uh, to tariff authority. There's a couple of other sort of more technical arguments that were in the case that we can talk about, but I think I've covered the major ones and what their position on this was, that essentially their argument is, like, give a broad interpretation to the words in the statute. Uh, give essentially an exemption from major questions and non-delegation, 'cause either it doesn't apply to foreign affairs or only applies very weakly. Uh, and finally, uh, an emergency and an unusual and extraordinary threat is whatever the president says that it is, uh, and that, you know, there should be de-- uh, delegation, I'm sorry, there should be deference by the judiciary in those areas.
Aaron Ross Powell: How confident were you that you were gonna win? Or I guess another way of asking this is, was there anything about the court's decision that surprised you?
Ilya Somin: So by the time we got to the Supreme Court, I speaking just purely for myself, I can't speak for others, and I can't talk about internal deliberations and litigation team because that's covered by attorney-client privilege. But I thought by that point it was more, much more likely that we would win than we would lose because we had won, uh, in the Court of International Trade three-judge panel. We won in the en banc Federal Circuit with 11 judges. We got seven out of the 11 votes, and we had gotten votes from both conservative and liberal justices or judges, I'm sorry, uh, I should have said. Uh, so we were more likely to win than to lose. And my confidence was also reinforced somewhat by the fact that we had these five or six different paths to victory, and previous experience had shown, I thought, that different judges were attracted to different arguments, and we only needed a five justices, each of them to be attracted to at least one argument. Didn't even have to be attracted to the same one. Uh, so, uh, the, the outcome and decision didn't surprise me very much. It was interesting to me, uh, that the de- the argument that the six most fully agreed on among themselves, the six justices in the majority, uh, was the argument that this simply doesn't, uh, authorize any tariffs at all. Though three of the six justices also relied on major questions, uh, and Justice Gorsuch in a concurring opinion relied on non-delegation as well. So it's interesting to me that that one sort of no tariffs at all argument was the one that ultimately got the most votes, though with the backdrop to it, as all of the justices mentioned, uh, in their different opinions, was that they weren't willing to let the president have virtually unlimited, uh, tariff authority. I was also a little surprised, though not totally, by just the sheer amount of material that the court generated. We have a total, I think, of six different opinions that total 170 pages. People were speculating why the decision took as long to come down as it did. I think we now know the answer, and that is that they were writing this massive amount of material. I think, frankly, some of these issues could have been disposed of in fewer pages, uh, but the justices didn't feel that way. So we have, uh, you know, a whole bunch of different opinions. Uh, you know, I think four different opinions, if I remember correctly, by, uh, the justices in the majority and, uh, two different dissents.
Aaron Ross Powell: What's come next? Has this been-- You won the case, but has it been a victory against tariffs in the sense the administration has now pivoted and is looking for other ways of making other attempts to do effectively the same thing? So has this been a lasting victory? Has it had a meaningful impact, or are we kind of back where we started with just a different set of arguments?
Ilya Somin: So with any Supreme Court case, a full understanding of its impact probably requires historical perspective, which I think we don't yet have, as it's only been a few months. That said, I don't think the impact of this is just solely limited to the specifics of the IEEPA statute, because all of the justices in the majority, while they did emphasize different kinds of arguments, they all emphasized this point that the president can't simply claim virtually unlimited tariff authority. And I think that has an implication for future cases. The three conservative justices in the majority, Gorsuch, Barrett, and Chief Justice Roberts, all also relied heavily on the major questions doctrine. While technically three justices' views is not a binding precedent of the court, it's certainly a signal to the lower court, uh, that major questions apply to tariffs. And I would add that the Federal Circuit decision did rely heavily on the major questions doctrine. All the justices in the majority-- the judge in the majority in that case did, and the Federal Circuit precedent is binding on all trade cases because they have, uh, review authority over the Court of International Trade. Uh, since the decision, Trump has tried to use Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 to replicate many of the tariffs. The Court of International Trade has ruled against that in a 2-1 decision issued a few we-weeks ago in cases brought by the state of Oregon, which also brought a case against the IEEPA tariffs and by my former co-counsel at the Liberty Justice Center. We'll see how that works out in appellate litigation. Uh, and then there's also a plan in the works to try to use Section 301 of the 1962 Trade Act to try to impose massive tariffs. When Trump actually does that, it seems like it'll occur in July or in August. There will likely be litigation over that, but I, I cannot know for sure what will happen in these cases. But I do think the Supreme Court has sent a signal that they will not allow virtually unlimited presidential tariff authority, and that's at least a positive sign for the eventual outcome of the litigation, uh, in these cases.
Aaron Ross Powell: Can we talk a bit about emergency powers and how to think about them? 'Cause that was part of the administration's claim in this. And we want-- we'd like the executive to be able to respond quickly in the case of emergencies. How do we, how do we litigate that kind of power? How do we think about, like, what it means to have an emergency, what authority the executive should have, and who should get to say, "No, it's not actually"?
Ilya Somin: Yeah. So the issue of what counts as an emergency and an unusual and extraordinary threat did come up in our case, and the Court of International Trade decided a case in our favor, in part based on a notion, uh, that there wasn't a proper, um, unusual and extraordinary threat with respect to some of these tariffs. The Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit did not address these issues because there we prevailed on other grounds. If the statute doesn't, uh, authorize tariffs at all or doesn't authorize tariffs on this scale, then you don't need to reach the issue of whether there's an emergency or an unusual and extraordinary threat. However, I thought a lot about this both during the case and before, and in my view, if you have an emergency power that's supposed to be usable only when there's some kind of special extraordinary situation, uh, then at the very least, the government should have to prove two things. One is they need to prove the emergency or unusual and extraordinary threat, or in some w-- immigration cases currently going on they've written about an invasion of the United States. You have to prove that the emergency threat or invasion actually exists, and it's not enough for the president to just say so, because otherwise he could use these emergency powers as blank checks anytime he wants. That goes against just the words in those laws which are supposed to be limited to extraordinary situations, but it's also a menace to civil liberties and to the American economy and the like if the president or any official can just use these powers whenever he feels like. And then secondly, if they can prove that the emergency or threat or what have you actually exists, they also need to show that the powers they're using are actually the ones that were delegated in the relevant constitutional or statutory provision. There, there's various arguments that can be deployed for, you know, deference to the executive in these kinds of cases. Uh, I think that those arguments just don't work and have dangerous implications. I'll just mention the one argument which says, well, the executive has specialized expertise, so when they say there's an invasion or an emergency or a threat, we gotta trust them. I think if there really is this major extraordinary situation, it should not be hard to prove that it actually exists. It should be very obvious that, like, uh, you know, th-that, you know, that when there is an actual invasion, for instance, something I've written about, uh, you shouldn't need an expert like me to tell you that there's one. You can just simply see, yeah, sort of Vladimir Putin's attack on Ukraine, that's pretty clearly an invasion. On the other hand, illegal migration and drug smuggling, whatever else you think about, they're just obviously not invasions. And similarly, trade deficits that have been existing for 50 years are not unusual or extraordinary or even a threat at all. Uh, so if there-- one of these things really is going on, it should not be hard to prove it. Second, at the very least, if you want to rely on notions of expertise, you have to show that expertise really is what's driving the government's decision here. And in many of these cases, it's very obvious that the emergency power is not being invoked because there's some specialized group of experts in the government who have realized, oh, there's this emergency that nobody else has noticed. It's that the emergency is pretty obviously, uh, the claim of emergency is being used as a pretext to pursue policies, in this case protectionism or immigration restrictionism, uh, that could not be passed through Congress or through the ordinary legislative and political process.
Aaron Ross Powell: So for a final question, zooming out. Executive power. We're, we're living through a moment where, in this case, it was a abuse of executive power, a pretty clear abuse of executive power in the service of economic nationalism, which has been driving, I think, a lot of what we have seen from the administration. Um, but in general, this is a moment where we have an administration that is unwilling to recognize constraints on its own power or only do so grudgingly, um, and that shows up in areas outside of just the tariffs. So looking ahead, we have a few more years of this administration and then the next one and then one after that. How should we be thinking about reining in executive power, preventing these kinds of abuses before they do the tremendous, say in this case, economic damage that these tariffs did while this case was being litigated?
Ilya Somin: Yeah. So I think there's sort of several fronts in which this fight needs to be waged. One is, yes, it's desirable to use litigation where possible to constrain sweeping assertions of executive power to damage the economy, civil liberties, and the rule of law. You know, we did this in the IEEPA case. Obviously, people can learn from our experience and other experiences and other cases and historical moments about how to do this better, uh, perhaps. It should also be combined with political action to rein in various emergency powers, like it's too easy for the president to declare a national emergency under the Emergencies Act of, uh, National Emergencies Act of 1976, I think it is. Uh, and then currently, the only way Congress can stop it is by passing a new law, uh, which is subject to president's veto power. Many people, both right and left, have proposed that that should be limited to 30 days or 60 days or some short period, uh, in which ca-- and after that, the emergency can be extended only if Congress affirmatively votes to do so. Uh, there is also a more general problem of one reason why the executive has managed to grab so much power over American economy and society is because the federal government regulates and controls so many aspects of our lives generally. And even a more conscientious and assiduous Congress than we currently have still couldn't possibly dictate how all those regulatory and taxation authorities should be used ahead of time. And that necessarily creates a lot of discretion for the executive, which is very easy to abuse, even in a more normal, uh, administration than this one. Uh, and so we also need to cut back the overall scope of executive power in various ways. And the part of the problem that we've been having is that, uh, the executive, the federal government in general is wielding all sorts of authorities that they're not supposed to have under the original meaning of the Constitution. I mentioned the issue of immigration restriction. James Madison, uh, Thomas Jefferson, others rightly said that this is not even a power that's given to the federal government in the original Constitution. You can say the same thing for stuff, things like the war on drugs. Uh, when we had alcohol prohibition, that constitutional amendment had to be enacted to enable that, the Eighteenth Amendment, which was later repealed. I would say the same thing about drug prohibition, that most of that, you know, simply is not a power of the federal government, and there are a number of other examples like this. Uh, so, uh, ideally, you know, we want more use of litigation of the type that, that we did. Uh, but you also want, uh, you know, more legislative action to cut back some of these powers, particularly emergency powers. And we should rethink both legislatively and judicially and in other ways the issue of whether the federal government should have as much power generally, uh, as it currently does. James Madison famously said in Federalist 10 that enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm. Uh, and certainly there are few statesmen more unenlightened than the current president and his advisors. But even your more conventional president is far from fully enlightened most of the time. And you should ask yourself, you know, do you really want even an average quality politician to control this vast range of powers? And even more significantly, do you want your political enemies when they get into office to have these powers? And if the answer to those questions are no, and they should be no, then maybe there should be much less of this power in the hands of both the federal government generally and the president in particular.
Aaron Ross Powell: Thank you so much, Ilya.
Ilya Somin: Thank you.
Aaron Ross Powell: If you enjoyed my conversation with Ilya, you can find more like it, along with original essays from contemporary liberal scholars, at www.liberalism.org.