Governance Beyond State Capacity
State capacity isn’t self-justifying, and private capacities may outperform it, including in disasters.

Two minutes before a devastating earthquake shook the ground in Venezuela on June 24, 2026, the phones of 11.4 million Venezuelans began to vibrate. Google’s Android operating system detects incipient earthquakes using built-in accelerometers to sense minute seismic vibrations as the tectonic plates begin to slip, then alerts users and warns them to seek safety. It isn’t possible to quantify how many lives might have been saved by the early warnings, but videos of people responding to the warnings that have been posted online suggest the system had a real and beneficial impact.
American policymakers should take note. The fact that smartphones are providing a crowdsourced layer of the early warning system for earthquakes is notable because the older, existing infrastructure for earthquake detection—first rolled out in Mexico in the 1990s—has been almost exclusively funded and run by national governments. For the better part of three decades, earthquake detection has been provided publicly, fully coordinated by the government. But today, with the addition of services like Android’s—provided by private companies using crowdsourced, non-official data—the supply of governance in earthquake detection has become a hybrid of public and private provision.
Android’s earthquake warning system offers a promising signal of innovative, alternative solutions to the ongoing crisis of public trust in America. The failures of institutions in critical sectors—like housing, healthcare, eldercare, childcare, and energy—are eroding public trust in the ability of a liberal democratic order to govern society effectively. We agree with that consensus. It’s hard to regain the public’s trust if the systems that make the day-to-day lives of ordinary citizens work keep failing. Identifying workable solutions that unlock abundance in these sectors is essential to the work of restoring trust in democracy. And rebuilding that trust is essential if we are to turn back the tide of extremist politics, whether from the ethno-nationalist right or the socialist left.
This is a solid footing for the broader conversation about improving state capacity by reinforcing or building anew institutions that can deliver to the public. But, as Anne Healy, the CEO of Recoding America notes, the underlying causes of failed governance can run deep, operating on a systemic level that’s difficult to address with surface reforms. She describes the problem this way:
The symptoms of broken government are visible, like unemployment systems that collapse just when they’re needed most. But the failures live in the plumbing underneath (how government hires, buys, builds, and learns), which is legible only to those who’ve waded through it.
We agree with Healy on identifying the deeper roots of government failure, but would offer a friendly yet important addition to state capacity arguments. With respect to any given policy or procedural challenge, expanded state capacity should be just one among several options on the table.
As privately sourced earthquake alerts suggest, state capacity is not the only tool in the governance toolbox. Alternative governance systems are percolating up using new technologies and decentralized organization, like crowdsourced wildfire alerts, automated pothole detection, and the implementation of secure digital identity. Each is a reminder that governance and government are not synonyms.
When expanded state capacity is proffered as the only solution, two areas of concern should introduce a measure of healthy skepticism. The first is in the name: state capacity. State capacity arguments tend to default toward the assumption that the state is the entity best positioned to provide solutions. In some cases, that may be true, but it should not be assumed from the outset.
A perspective informed by public choice economics interrogates that assumption and offers a warning. When it comes to complex human systems, a state’s policy tools are blunt instruments. Its interventions routinely produce new problems that may cause even greater harm than the original problem the intervention was meant to alleviate. And the burdens of those unintended consequences often fall on the very people the interventions were designed to help.
Consider the humble Maine lobster. In the 1990s, out of concern about the theoretical potential of overfishing, which had negatively affected other fish species in prior decades, federal regulators capped the number of traps lobstermen could set. Doing so, however, had the opposite of the intended effect. For hundreds of years, lobstering families had self-policed overharvesting through informal social norms, common law parceling of lobstering grounds, and community shaming of the non-compliant. Replacing that functional system with a hard trap limit imposed by technocrats from distant Washington, DC backfired spectacularly.
Lobstermen were thrown into a classic tragedy of the commons, in which the incentive was for every boat captain to catch as many lobsters as possible, up to the limit, and long-term considerations be damned. As a result, lobster populations plummeted. Finally, after several disastrous years, governance was finally restored to local control, catch rates were stabilized, and the lobster population has since boomed. It was a lesson in how rules imposed from above by a centralized authority can fail to appreciate the utility of local knowledge and local control.
This is a finding common to the public choice school of economics. Public choice scholars, such as Nobel laureates James Buchanan and Elinor Ostrom, were not opposed to government remedies as such. Rather, they held space for a core question: “When is centralized authority essential, and when is it likely to backfire?” Rarely was the answer “always” or “never.” Ostrom’s own life work showed that local communities, like those Maine lobstermen, routinely navigate complex challenges and govern well through polycentric arrangements featuring overlapping centers of decisionmaking, both public and private.
The ultimate goal of governance is the provision of reliable, efficient, and high-quality services, not the public or private nature of the deliverer per se. Good governance is outcome-focused and means-agnostic, provided those means do not violate individual rights or constitutional constraints. When only the state can effectively provide an essential service, then the state ought to be empowered to do so. But when the best means of accomplishing the ends of good governance include non-state alternatives, we ought to be open to the possibility.
The public choice perspective also warns us against the potential for abuse. Any time we expand state capacity, we are also expanding state power and increasing the risk that it could be turned toward illiberal ends. For example, the same mechanisms that allow government to perform its operations more efficiently can be turned toward warrantless, AI-powered surveillance, sweeping enforcement measures that violate privacy and the due process rights of both citizens and noncitizens. Some state capacity advocates now openly pursue what has been described as “dark abundance”—a state with all the capacity it needs, yet aimed at illiberal ends. Yet you don’t have to intend a society of dark abundance to build the road to it. State capacity outlasts the intentions of the people who create it. Capacity expanded by one administration to do good is inherited by the next, whoever that turns out to be, and whatever they intend to do with it.
With both these concerns in view, we see what might otherwise be in our blind spot: state capacity is not self-justifying. With this insight internalized, we are better able to anticipate the problems government remedies might unintentionally create. We train our moral and political imagination to foresee how illiberal strongmen might deploy such power to our detriment. And we’re better positioned to identify promising non-state solutions.
The United States does not have to start from a blank slate. Our conversations about democracy and abundance should include insights from places like Estonia, a little country that has done big things in the three decades since its independence from totalitarian occupation. Estonia has streamlined citizen access to public services while preserving limitations on state power and safeguarding citizens’ control over their own data. Estonians have built a high-trust society deeply rooted in liberal values even while facing the constant threat of interference by their hostile neighbor, Russia.
Nowhere is the contrast between Estonian innovation and American staleness in governance more clear than with Estonia’s principle of citizen ownership of data. Estonians are able to use their secure digital identity cards to see who has accessed any of their information held in government databases. They can know which government agency or private entity pulled the data and when they did so, making it far easier for citizens and journalists to hold their government to account when it abuses that access. Contrast Estonia’s system with America’s antiquated and obfuscated government databases. A nineteen-year-old DOGE intern with a nickname like “Big Balls” might access your social security information or potentially download it to unsecure servers for unknown purposes and you would have no way of knowing any details about that shocking abuse.
To zoom back out, those working to rebuild the public’s trust in democracy and unlock abundance for all should first be willing to ask, “Is expanded state capacity the best or only option?” A state capacity field mature enough to consider that question—to treat non-state and polycentric solutions as realistic alternatives rather than heresies—is a stronger and more durable field than one that meets every problem with a reflexive call for an expanded state. That is a field worth building together.
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